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An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response 
to Chief Justice Warren Burger's 
"Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" 
Theory in Parham v. J.R. 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, EsQ. 
The legal system prides itself on rigorous issues analysis, logical thought 
Processes and comprehensive use of factual data in cases involving the 
social sciences. Since the famed "Brandeis brief' was filed with the United 
States Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York 1 some 50 years ago, the 
employment of social science data in public policy cases has been a bench-
mark of the appellate court process. In cases as disparate as Brown v. Board 
of Education, 2 Baker v. Carr:3 and Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke,4 factual and scientific data has been molded by the US Supreme 
Court to shape and buttress opinions involving virtually every controversial 
facet of American life. Seemingly-unresolvable issues of race, religion and 
politics have been decided through the use of such data. 
To what extent, however, has this model been carried over to the field of 
mental health law on the Supreme Court level? While State and lower 
Federal courts have regularly used statistical data in mental disability litiga-
tion in such areas as predictivity of dangerousness,5 right to treatment6 and 
the right to refuse treatment, 7 to what extent has this trend been followed by 
the US Supreme Court? Perhaps not surprisingly, a review of the literature 
fails to reveal a single article on this topic; after all, the Supreme Court has 
decided more-mental health constitutional law cases in the past 15 months 
(three) than it had in the prior 193 years (two). In spite of this (or, perhaps, 
because of it) it is still an issue worthy of some consideration. 
Specifically, how did the Supreme Court choose to deal with empirical 
data in the cases of Parham v. J.R.8 and Secretary of Public Welfare v. 
Institutionalized Juveniles9 (hereinafter sometimes jointly referred to as 
Parham) on the question of the extent to which due process protections 
~Pply to the "voluntary" commitment of juveniles to psychiatric institu-
tions? Unlike Addington v. Texas 10 and Vitek v. Jones11-the court's other 
two recent forays into mental health law-Parham and Institutionalized 
Juveniles were class actions with extensive factual records developed below 
after lengthy, adversarial trials; both had been argued and reargued before 
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the Supreme Court in an earlier term, and both had been watched carefully 
by mental health professionals, other service providers, patients and ~ttor­
neys. It could be expected that the court's treatment of empirical data m the 
Parham pair of decisions would likely be a harbinger of its future ventures in 
this area. 
Parham, of course, reversed a three-judge district court decisio? 12 ~hich 
had declared Georgia's juvenile commitment statutes unconst1tut~onal, 
holding that that state's procedures were both reasonable and consistent 
with constitutional guarantees. 1211 It did, however, go on to rule that (a) the 
risk of error inherent in parental decision-making on the question of in-
stitutionalizing a child was sufficiently great to mandate an independent 
inquiry by a "neutral factfinder" to determine whether statutory admission 
requirements were met/3 (b) although the hearing need not be formal nor 
conducted by a judicial officer, the inquiry must "Carefully probe the 
child's background using all available services, including, but not limited to, 
parents, schools and other social agencies," 14 (c) that the decision-maker 
has the authority to refuse to admit a child who does not meet the medical 
standards for admission 1" and (d) the need for continued commitment must 
be periodically reviewed by a similarly independent procedure. ts 
As an aside, it should be noted that, while Parham is usually seen as a 
defeat for the "patients' bar," 17 it contains much language which has been 
subsequently cited to support pro-plaintiff decisions . Thus, its holding that 
commitment constituted a deprivation of a protected "substantial liberty 
interest" 18 and that the protectible interest extended to the question of 
''being labeled erroneously ... because of an improper decision by the state 
hospital superintendent'.' 19 was subsequently cited by Judge Brotman in 
Rennie v. Klein 1120 as "strengthen[ing]" the due process of holding of 
Rennie 121 (decided pre-Parham) that due process be provided prior to the 
forced administration of drugs and by the Third Circuit in Halderman v · 
~ennhurst State School and HospitaF2 for the proposition that '· Constitu-
tional law developments incline in [the] direction of [ deinstitutionalization 
as the favored approach to habilitation].'' 
.Its .hol~i.ng, then, should not give much succor to those who see it as a 
maJor JU?1cial retrenchment. Even more significantly, its holding is limited 
to ~ase~ mvolvingjuveniles: of the roughly 20 states which-via court rule, 
legislation or State constitutional decision_ provide greater than Parham-
level due process protections for juveniles in peril of commitment,23 none 
has abrogated or significantly altered its procedures in the 14 months since 
the Parham decision was issued. 
That Parham has had such a minimal effect appears, on the surface, at 
least,. to ?e s~rprising. Generally, even when a Supreme Court decision is 
not bmdmg, its moral weight is taken seriously by State legislatures and 
State courts. The studied indifference to Parham - although not the central 
focus .of this paper - is, in and of itself, worthy of notice and greater 
attention. 
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Perhaps, however, some of the "non-impact" of Parham can be ex-
plained away by the way in which the Court chose to treat the empirical 
issue of what actually happens at a "contested" commitment hearing. For it 
is here that Chief Justice Warren Burger sets out - for a five-member 
majority of the court - his philosophy on the issue at hand, and it is here 
where it could be expected that pertinent data would play a major role in 
shaping the Court's ultimate decision. 
First, the Chief Justice discussed the state's interest "in not imposing 
unnecessary procedural obstacles that may discourage the mentally ill or 
their families from seeking needed psychiatric assistance,' ' 24 an observation 
which simultaneously assumes (1) the persons at risk are genuinely mentally 
ill, (2) they are in need of psychiatric assistance and (3) such psychiatric 
assistance is available at the institutions to which the juveniles are being 
committed. Interestingly, although the lower court opinions in both 
Parham25 and Institutionalized Juveniles26 discussed many individual cases 
at length (some of which fit none of the Court's three assumptions on this 
point), the Court makes no reference to any case history, supporting data or 
scientific research on this point. 27 
It continued in the same vein: 
The parens patriae interest in helping parents care for the mental 
health of their children cannot be fulfil led if the parents are unwilling 
to take advantage of the opportunities because the admission proc-
ess is too onerous, too embarrassing or too contentious. It is surely 
not idle to speculate as to how many parents who believe they are 
acting in good faith would forego State-provided hospital care if such 
care is contingent on participation in an adversary proceeding de-
signed to probe their motives and other private family matters in 
seeking tbe voluntary admission. 28 
• 
Again, the Chief Justice does not explain how the admission process is 
"Too onerous, too embarrassing or too contentious," and although he 
''Speculate [ s J as to how many parents ... would forego State-provided 
hospital care" if it were contingent on an adversarial trial, he nowhere 
indicates the basis for his speculation. 
Immediately thereafter, the opinion continues similarly: 
The State also has a genuine interest in allocating priority to the 
diagnosis and treatment of patients as soon as they are admitted to a 
hospital rather than to time-consuming procedural minuets before the 
admission. One factor that must be considered is the utilization of the 
time of psychiatrists, psychologists and other behavioral specialists 
in preparing for and participating in hearings rather than performing 
the task for which their special training has fitted them. Behavioral 
experts in courtrooms and hearings are of little help to patients. 29 
• 
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Although the Court cites a study provided by amicus curiae American 
Psychiatric Association that the average hospital staff psychiatrist spends 
only 47% of his time on direct patient care,a0 it offers neither data nor theory 
to explain why such hearings would be "time-consuming proced~ral 
minuets .'' In fact, the only footnote in the quoted paragraph is to an oft-cited 
law review article by Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly which notes 
"That, at some point, the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard 
is substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and 
that the expense in protecting those likely to be found undeserving will 
probably come out of the pockets of the deserving. ":31 
The court continued by analyzing "What process is constitutionally 
due , ":12 stressing that "The questions are essentially medical in character: 
whether the child is mentally or emotionally ill and whether he can benefit 
from the treatment provided by the State.' ':1a Although the Court acknowl-
edged "The fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, ":34 citing to the 
Chief Justice's concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson,:i5 it added, 
again, without supporting reference: 
[w]e do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of 
specialists can always be avoided by shifting the decision from a 
trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an 
untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type 
hearing.:is 
• 
In this vein, the opinion observed further: 
Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that 
the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine 
the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and 
treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory 
than real. See Albers, Pasewark and Meyer, Involuntary Hospitali-
zation and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of 
Immaculate Perception, 6 Cap. U.L. Rev . 11, 15 (1976).:37 
• 
. Significantly, the cited authority- and the other four articles discussed 
tn the accompanying footnote 1737A - all discuss the inadequate job counsel 
usually performs at commitment hearings, and urge a more vigorous role for 
counsel; none suggests that counsel should not be appointed or is unneces-
sary _:is 
The opinion continues by stating its philosophical premise: that hearings 
would intrude into the parent-child relationship. Without any supporting 
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citation, reference to the court record or analysis of behavioral research, it 
sets out its rationale: 
Another problem with requiring a formalized, factfinding hearing 
lies in the danger it poses for significant intrusion into the parent-
child relationship. Pitting the parents and child as adversaries often 
will be at odds with the presumption that parents act in the best 
interests of their child. It is one thing to require a neutral physician to 
make a careful review of the parents' decision in order to make sure 
it is proper from a medical standpoint; it is a wholly different matter 
to employ an adversary contest to ascertain whether the parents' 
motivation is consistent with the child's interests. 
Moreover, it is appropriate to inquire into how such a hearing 
would contribute to the long-range successful treatment of the pa-
tient. Surely, there is a risk that it would exacerbate whatever 
tensions.already existed between the child and the parents. Since the 
parents can and usually do play a significant role in the treatment 
while the child is hospitalized and even more so after release , there is 
a serious risk that an adversary confrontation will adversely affect 
the ability of the parents to assist the child while in the hospital. 
Moreover, it will make his subsequent return home more difficult . 
These unfortunate results are especially ciitical with an emotionally 
disturbed child; they seem likely to occur in the context of an 
adversary hearing in which the parents testify. A confrontation over 
such intimate family relationships would distress the normal adult 
parents and the impact on a disturbed child almost certainly would 
be significantly greater.=rn 
• 
The majority opm1on was sharply criticized by Mr. Justice William 
Brennan , writing for himself, and Justices Thurgood Marshall and John 
Stevens in a three-judge dissent. According to the dissent, the Chief Jus-
~ice' s opinion "Ignores reality [when it J assumes [ s J blindly that parents act 
in their children's best interests when making commitment decisions. " 40 
Although the minority felt that a pre-admission adversarial hearing "Might 
traumatize both parent and child and make the child's eventual return to his 
family more difficu lt ," 4 1 it recommended the institution of post-admission 
commitment hearings. It noted: 
[T]he interest in avoiding family discord would be less signifi-
cant at this stage, since the family autonomy already wiII have been 
fractured by the institutionalization of the child . In any event, post-
admission heaiings are unlikely to disrupt family relationships. 42 
• 
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Finally, the dissent concluded: 
Children incarcerated in public mental institutions are constitu-
tionally entitled to a fair opportunity to contest the legitimacy of 
their confinement. They are entitled to some champion who can 
speak on their behalf and who stands ready to oppose a wrongful 
commitment. Georgia should not be permitted to deny that oppor-
tunity and that champion simply because the children's parents or 
guardians wish them to be confined without a hearing. The risk of 
erroneous commitment is simply too great unless there ts some form 
of adversarial review, and fairness demands that children aban-
doned by their supposed protectors to the rigors of institutional 
confinement be given the help of some separate voice.4a 
• 
In a sharply-worded critique of the Parham opinion, the counsel for 
plaintiffs in Institutionalized Juveniles has written: 
The decisions by the Supreme Court in Institutionalized Juveniles 
and Parham ignore the facts, distort the law and condemn children to 
second-class citizenship. The physical conditions, isolation and 
dangers of day-to-day life in institutions are ignored. Inevitable bias 
and conflict of interest of institutional professional staff are danger-
ously and incorrectly underplayed. Also overlooked and undis-
cussed is the critical necessity of a hearing and a children's advocate 
to assure noninstitutional care whenever possible . Those children 
most in need of protection, the youngest and most disabled, are 
denied any protection at all. Children who are already under the 
State's control and without the limited protection parents can pro-
vide are denied hearings as well. 44 
• 
It may be too early to speculate as to whether or not, in reality, children 
actu~lly have been "condemn[ ed]" to "second-class citizenship," as 
David Ferleger suggests. It is not speculative, however, to ponder how and 
why the Supreme Court reached its decision without even discussing data 
that was presented to it about what actually happens in such hearings, and 
what the results of such hearings are . 
First, as indicated above, the American Psychiatric Association had 
filed an amicus curiae brief, arguing that due process hearings "May in 
certain cases inflict psychological harm on children because of the unique 
emotion-laden nature of the parent-child conflicts that will be aired in those 
hearings . " 45 In support of this argument, amicus APA cited several articles 
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as to why hospitalization may be traumatic to the parent, but none as to its 
possible effect on the child. 46 The brief cited James Ellis' seminal article on 
why counsel should be provided at such hearings,47 arguing that the scenario 
Ellis envisions - at which lawyers could'' Examine the parents as witness-
es in order to explore their reasons for seeking the child's commitment, their 
perceptions of the child's problems and their relationship to the family's 
problems" 48 - "Could have significant negative consequences. " 49 
Such hearings "Can severely strain the relationship between the parent 
and the child, " 50 amicus APA alleged, because it is "Most distressing to 
children [to hear J 'Negative remarks made about them by the parents. ' '' 51 
Importantly, its citations in support of this argument refer to studies of 
juvenile delinquency hearing,52 juveniles in need of supervision" hearings5a 
and child abuse hearings54 which show that ''judicial proceedings are 
'damaging to an already-strained family situation.' " 55 
Similar studies - not involving the specific fact situation before the 
court - are cited for the proposition that "In certain instances, court 
hearings create a considerable feeling of uneasiness, if not anger in the 
child,"56 and that such hearings may "intimidate and confuse" younger 
children,07 even going so far as to possibly harm "the course of the child's 
therapy" because the hearing could be viewed "As an attack on the compe-
tence and judgment of the child's therapist.' ' 58 For this proposition, the brief 
cites one paper on "Children's Rights and the Juvenile Court"59 for the 
proposition that the adversarial role of lawyers is antithetical to good child 
care because (I) the ' 'Disturbed child ... abandons the right to confidential-
ity,'' and (2) ·'A perceived attack on a therapist may negate the value of 
therapy.' '60 
Finally, the amicus APA brief suggests that the benefits of hearings are 
"often overstated" because they are frequently "perfunctory, ritualistic, 
impersonal, superficial and presumptive of mental illness, " 6 1 citing to two 
studies (one of which was adopted by the court62) which critize the court for , 
in amicus' own words, "Most often accepting uncritically the psychiatric 
recommendation .' ' 63 
The meretriciousness of the proposition is obvious: while arguing 
strongly elsewhere that commitment proceedings are not and should not be 
considered criminal or quasi-criminal, 64 the APA urges the Supreme Court 
to reject due process protections based on experiences in those supposedly 
dissimilar proceedings; the authorities it relies on on the issue of the harm-
fulness of hearings presuppose the preexistence of a therapeutic relation-
ship between a disturbed child and his/her treater, a dyad not commonly 
found in many state hospitals (officials at the Georgia hospital that was at the 
center of the Parham controversy, for instance, acknowledged that at least 
46 children at that facil ity "Needed to be in a non-institutional setting and 
Were being harmed by continued incarceration"). 65 The "Children's 
Rights" paper cited in the brief-which appears to deal with juvenile delin-
quents - act~ally opposes ''The current generally unsatisfactory way of 
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treating children in residential care. " 65A a proposition supportive of plain-
tiffs' position, not defendants'. 
Finally, the brief stands the line of authorities cited on the issue of th.e 
perfunctoriness of commitment hearings on its head by suggesting that thelf 
brevity and inadequacy is a reason to not have them; all of the authorities in 
question urge an expanded role of counsel to make such hearings more 
meaningful. 66 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court readily embraced the basic proposi-
tions proffered by amicus APA without much consideration of its supporting 
data. On the other hand, it totally failed to acknowledge, consider, deal with 
or rebut the data presented by another amicus, the Division of Mental 
Health Advocacy of the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate. 66A 
Since September, 1975, the Division of Mental Health Advocacy, a 
statutory agency ,67 has provided independent legal representation to 
juveniles facing involuntary civil commitment proceedings in six of New 
Jersey's 21 counties, pursuant to court rule,68 in a format comporting with 
the full range of procedural due process protections .69 Its experiences -
and the experiences of its clients - have been totally opposite the scenario 
sketched by the Supreme Court and suggested by amicus APA. Its statistics 
and dispositions reveal that individual (often creative) determinations are 
made by the assigned judges on individual basis. Dispositions are not limited 
to a finite commit/release paradigm (as feared); parents have been generally 
pleased with the counsel's involvement (in spite of the ostensible'' adversar-
iness" of the proceedings); in fact, counsel has served to alleviate familial 
tension and strengthen inter-familial bonds; representation has led to excep-
tional judicial creativity in an area not known for such developments. 
Some background as to the Division's role in commitment cases is 
necessary. Although conceived of by statute as "law offices,'' the regional 
offices operate, in practical effect, as a partnership among all professionals 
- attorneys, psychologists , social workers and others - on the staff. The 
ultimate service provided may be "legal" in nature (i.e., serving as counsel 
or, in the case of ajuvenile, as guardian ad litem as well, at a legal proceeding 
such as a commitment hearing or a periodic review) , but input into the final 
result comes from all staff members. The field representative interviews the 
patient/client initially and gathers all data pertinent to the type of legal 
representation called for. In the case of a commitment hearing, the field 
representative will ascertain (I) The client's current medical/psychological 
condition as evidenced both by the hospital records and by the field rep-
resentative's assessment of the client at the time of the interview; (2) The 
client's background- both social and medical- and current family situa-
tion; (3) The availability of alternative care facilities appropriate to the 
client's needs; (4) The need for recruiting independent psychiatric tes-
timony to present on behalf of the client at the hearing. For periodic 
reviews, the field representative will obtain information pertinent to one 
through four above, and, in addition, will review the patient's history of 
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hospitalization to evaluate the nature of the care and treatment rendered in 
an effort to determine if continued hospitalization is appropriate. 
The field representative then confers and works closely with the attor-
ney to develop the appropriate legal strategies in light of the individual 
patient/client's needs and desires. The attorney appears at the hearing as the 
patient/client's advocate, to advance that individual's desires to the 
maximum extent feasible and to give the client a means of reaching outside 
the system for an examination of situations in which his rights as an indi-
vidual citizen may have been violated. 10 
What, then, has been the result of those cases in which the Division of 
Mental Health Advocacy has represented juveniles in accordance with 
court rule? In partial preparation of its amicus brief, the Division reviewed 
the 213 files of juvenile clients it has represented from September, 1975 
(when the rule change mandating counsel was implemented) to August, 1977 
(the time of the writing of the brief). Parenthetically, the vast majority of the 
Division's c1ients were between 15-17 years old, although one child was as 
young as seven. 
In the 213juvenile cases closed by amicus' field offices, the dispositions 
reveal a pattern of individualized court determinations. In addition, the 
dispostions of the cases reveal that counsel- in New Jersey-fulfills those 
multiple functions urged by respected commentators. 71 
Thus, of the 213 closed files, 72 34 of the juveniles were discharged 
following the involvement of amicus as counsel, but prior to a formal 
hearing, 31 were released at such a hearing (in virtually all cases to their 
parents' or guardian's custody), 14 were "discharged pending place-
ment, " 73 six were "discharged pending placement" to a facility adminis-
tered by New Jersey's Division of Mental Retardation, 74 15 were "dis-
charged pending placement,'' to a residential school, 75 one was ''discharged 
pending placement'' to a drug rehabilitation facility, 76 one was discharged to 
the custody of Division of Mental Retardation officials, four were dis-
charged subject to certain conditions, 77 two were transferred to out-of-state 
hospitals, 78 three were ordered admitted to a special education program 
While institutionalized,79 five were remanded to local jails or youth deten-
tion facilities to await trial on criminal offenses or hearings on juvenile 
delinquency petitions, or to a facility for "juveniles in need of supervision" 
[1INS] 80 and one was discharged to a foster home. In addition, in two cases, 
adjournments were entered (so as to facilitate residential school placement 
and to avert the potentially stigmatic effect ofa commitment label),8 1 and, in 
38 cases, voluntary applications for admission were accepted.82 Finally, in 
22 cases, commitment was ordered, and in 30 cases, confinement was 
continued. 8:3 
These statistics reflect, then, individual determinations on individual 
bases. Dispositions are not Limited to a finite commit/release paradigm (a 
fear often articulated by those who see the involuntary civil commitment 
Process as taking on all of the trappings of the criminal trial). On the other 
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hand, they are specifically structured so that an individualized determina-
tion can be made-following the full participation of counsel at all relevant 
stages of the proceedings - in the manner contemplated by many of the 
commentators, including Dr. Alan Stone, who have pondered this issue .8:iA 
Significantly, in a lengthy and thoughtful analysis of this problem, As-
sistant US Attorney John P. Pannenton has noted: 
Both the doctor and the minor's attorney should independently 
determine whether the child is being coerced into seeking psychitric 
help. Then a search should be conducted to ascertain whether possi-
ble alternatives to institutionalization exist in the community. Out-
patient treatment, special education programs, foster homes and 
family counseling services, to name only a few, may further the 
child's interest far better than institutionalization. If the adult desig-
nated to represent the child finds that his client wishes to contest the 
hospitalization, the role to be assumed by the adult is that of an 
adversary. As such, the skills of an attorney are required to prepare 
a proper defense and to obtain all relevant information which may 
prove beneficial to the child.84 
• 
Indeed , the roles played by amicus in the cases in question have gone far 
beyond simple trial representation: in many of those cases in which amicus 
was appointed guardian ad litem as well as counsel,85 orders were entered 
continuing the Division as guardian ad litem beyond the actual formal 
commitment (or acceptance of the voluntary application)so as to facilitate 
and insure the implementation of an aftercare plan. In other cases, amicus 
has played an active role in such areas as facilitation of school placement, 86 
and unblocking of available funds for special educational programs, assist-
ing the family in obtaining an appropriate community education program for 
the juvenile,87 representing juveniles on individualized right to treatment88 
or right to obtain Medicaid funds actions,89 facilitation ofan available family 
therapy program, provision of independent psychiatric expertise to the 
family so that the juvenile could readjust to his home setting after commit-
ment , resolution of conflicts between social service agencies (e.g., Division 
~f ~ outh ~nd Family Services [ DYFS]) and the juvenile's family, _and 
fmdmg suitable aftercare or alternative care placements. These vanous 
functions again, reflect a "counseling attitude" that far transcends the 
narrow range of choices often feared as a necessary concomitant to the 
presence of adversarial counsel.90 
In addition, while preparing its brief, the Division asked its trial office 
attorneys to assess how the juvenile's parents felt about their children's 
representation by independent counsel. Although admittedly subjective, 
such responses mark the only instance in which such feelings have ever 
been sought out. 
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It appears that - in most cases - parents were affirmatively pleased 
with the involvement of amicus. Although parents were hostile to the role of 
adversary counsel in a handful of cases, in the vast majority, parents were 
described by amicus counsel as "enthusiastic about our involvement," 
"thankful for involvement," "receptive," "cooperative," "positive ," 
"helpful," "pleased," "grateful," "very involved," "appreciative," 
"supportive" and " interested and informative." 
Interestingly, in at least four cases, parents who began with "negative" 
feelings or who were' 'uncooperative' ' with counsel, radically changed their 
attitudes during the course of representation and became "positive" or 
"cooperative" by the time of the final hearing. In these cases, it is most 
clear that counsel did not exacerbate tension; rather, its presence actually 
served to alleviate such feelings and strengthen interfamilial bonds . 
Another phenomenon worth noting is that, in those cases in which 
counsel either represented the juvenile on treatment questions or actively 
sought an after-care or out-patient program, in virtually all instances, par-
ents were especially positive about Division of Mental Health Advocacy 
involvement. Thus, one casenote indicates, "Mother attended hearing; 
appreciates 'pushing' by DMHA f Division of Mental Health Advocacy J for 
placement" (client placed in appropriate facility for juveniles with learning 
disabilities); in another, where ajuvenile was discharged to the custody ofa 
"JINS" program administrator, the note reads, "Father interested: pleased 
with final disposition; participated in decision." 
Thus, it has been suggested that, ''In a crisis situation, parents may go to 
the first facility about which they are told or to whatever facility is 
closest[,] ... see[ing] hospital care as the only approach to the crisis. " 91 
The presence of outside counsel serves to help insure that this parental 
decision-often premised on incomplete or inaccurate information - is not 
made and ratified in a factual vacuum, an especially pressing problem in 
fami lies of lower socioeconomic status: "For poor families, dependent 
upon public institutions, their problem is compounded by a more limited 
number of resources from which to choose. " 92 
Finally, the presence of counsel has Jed to exceptional judicial creativity 
in an area in which, most likely, such creativity would be conspicuously 
absent but for the presence of an adversarial role. In one case, a ''treatment 
program'' mainly consisting of over 200 electroshock applications and 23 
hours a day in seclusion - structured in response to the "behavior prob-
lems'' of a young girl with an organic brain condition - was struck down as 
violative of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel. and unusual punish-
ment;93 in another matter, the court held that a juvenile - on his own -
could voluntarily admit himself to an institution (thus avoiding the stigma 
inherent in an involuntary commitment) if he ''Understood the nature of a 
voluntary commitment and grasped the significance of the . .. proceed-
ings; '94 in another, the court held that all documents and records pertaining 
to the involuntary commitment proceedings be impounded ''To protect the 
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interests of the juvenile. "95 Also, where amicus represented a juveni~e 
whose condition had been gravely deteriorating and on whom psychotropic 
medication was having no positive effect, and where both the juvenile's 
independent psychiatric expert witness and the hospital physical advocated 
the use of electroshock, amicus petitioned the court to determine the need 
for such treatment. 96 Following the hearing, the treatment was ordered and 
administered, and the juvenile has been subsequently discharged. 97 
In the case of a nine-year old autistic child, amicus successfully 
petitioned the court to prohibit the use of aversive, electroprod therapy, 
unless rigorous standards for staff training and program management were 
met. 98 As the hospital did not comply with the court-ordered conditions, a 
previously entered order mandating such "treatment" was subsequently 
vacated. Elsewhere, the court ordered a local school board to reconvene 
from recess so as to immediately appropriate funds (the release of which 
would be otherwise blocked due to the recess) to provide specialized treat-
ment for the juvenile in question. 99 
Amicus concluded: 
Cases such as these reflect the end results of the presence of 
counsel: the presentation to the courts of individual cases in a 
manner susceptible to individualized creative determinations. 
Clearly, fears as to the involvement of counsel appear groundless. A 
system which affords counsel and other procedural protections to 
juveniles facing commitment is eminently workable. 100 
• 
In addition, amicus Division argued that procedural due process 
safeguards would not be detrimental to juveniles; rather, it suggested, such 
safeguards are beneficial to all parties involved in juvenile commitment 
matters. At such hearings, independent counsel should have multiple roles, 
including, inter alia, ascertaining the juvenile's true wishes, explaining 
possible outcomes to the client (including, specifically, potential restrictiv-
ity of setting, alternative treatment modalities , facility regulations, etc .), 
counseling the client on consequences of hospitalization, and "pre-
sent[ ing] ... [the client's] wishes in as effective a manner as possible." 101 
It cited Ellis' seminal article: 
160 
Finally, while the lawyer should try to avoid becoming a middle 
person in future power struggles between the client and the hospital 
(or parents) because of the detrimental impact that might have on the 
client's acceptance of ordered treatment, it is appropriate for the 
attorney to reassure the client that counsel will again be available at 
the time of the periodic review of commitment, and may also be 
available if problems arise concerning in-hospital civil liberties. The 
knowledge that there is someone on the ''outside'' who is concerned 
about his or her fate after hospitalization may be one of the most 
valuable things a lawyer can give to a child-client. 102 
• 
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This position, of course, in no way conflicts with Alan Stone ' s on the 
same issue: 
Surely, some of the aforementioned functions are social serv ice 
roles which far transcend what has traditionally been viewed as the 
attorney's function , but if the attorney does not fill some of these 
needs, it is unlikely that anyone else will; and without aid of counsel, 
commitment can easily become a summary or self-fulfilling process. 
There are, increasingly, lawyers who understand and are willing to 
fill these needs , and if counsel come to be perceived as coworkers in 
the mental health system, dedicated to the aforementioned array of 
purposes, and not merely as righteously contentious obstructors, 
their presence during the commitment process will be welcomed 
rather than dreaded. 103 
• 
Amicus also dealt with the issue of the impact of active counsel on the 
involuntary commitment process and found that it was clear that counsel 
plays a critical, and in some cases, nearly dispositive role in involuntary 
commitment proceedings - where active attorneys are employed, fewer 
persons are committed, 104 and that "Intervention by counsel acting as 
patient's attorney tremendously increases chances of discharge, not to 
mention the other alternatives to hospitalization that may also be worked 
out to the patient's satisfaction . " 105 
In the same vein, amicus' review of the literature found that, if a child is 
not afforded _due process, it is likely that the resulting institutionalization 
will not resu lt in any '' lasting peace'' in the family. 106 It has been suggested, 
thus, that judicial nonintervention supports the integrity of the family unit 
only in the sense that it allows the parents in a dysfunctional family to deny 
the existence of real family problems by '' Blaming them on the illness of one 
of their children." 101 Such "artificial domestic tranquility" 108 should not 
serve as a rationalization for the denial of procedural due process. 
Not a single one of amicus' points, however, was dealt with in the 
Supreme Court's ultimate opinion. Although a lead article-published after 
the Parham briefs were filed, but before a decision was rendered -
·analyzed what actually hl:lppens at commitment hearings , and concluded 
that such inquiries "Contain considerable potential for therapeutic ef-
fects," 109 that article was not cited anywhere in the Supreme Court's 
lengthy opinion in Parham. Nowhere are any of the arguments in question 
addressed. 
In summary, in spite of the Chief Justice's assertions, the credible-and 
uncontroverted-evidence before the Court could lead only to the ines-
capable conclusion that counseled due process hearings for juveniles are 
necessary, effective and ameliorative; the suggestion that they are merely 
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' ' time-consuming procedural minuets'' distorts the fact , the law and reality . 
The startling fact that no state has voluntarily abrogated its own pre-Parham 
procedural due process safeguards scheme in the last year-and-a-half 
perhaps indicates that no one will dance the minuet with the Chief Justice . 
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